What future for European jobs? by Pissarides, Christopher
A
t the Lisbon summit of
2000, the European
Union (EU) set an
ambitious agenda for
making Europe the
most competitive
economy in the world. Among its many
targets were these for employment and
growth: by 2010, the EU should have
employment rates for the working-age 
(15-64) population as close as possible to
70%, for women at least 60% and for the
55-64 age group 50%; and as the main
driver of growth, spending on research and
development (R&D) should be at least 3%
of GDP, with two thirds or more done by
the private sector.
These targets are unlikely to be
achieved. Progress has been slow and a
comparison between the EU and other
OECD countries shows that although some
countries improved their employment
performance, in the first five years since
Lisbon, no country that was below the
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In a world of rapid technological progress and
increasing international competition, how can
European countries improve their poor employment
performance? Christopher Pissarides argues 
that much needs to change in the lower 
productivity, more labour-intensive service sectors 
of the economy.
What future for
European jobs?
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Figure 1:
Employment rates in 1999 and 2004
P
er
ce
n
ta
ge
 o
f 
w
or
ki
n
g 
ag
e 
p
op
u
la
ti
on
 w
h
o 
w
er
e 
em
p
lo
ye
d
 i
n
 2
00
4
Percentage of working age population who were employed in 1999
Source: OECD Employment Outlook
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70% line in 1999 progressed sufficiently far
towards the line by 2004 (see Figure 1).
What explains this failure? It seems to
me that the central problem is not a lack of
knowledge of what policies can work but
one of implementation. The European
Employment Strategy of 1997 contained
several specific measures designed to
increase job creation. The OECD has
repeatedly emphasised increased flexibility,
adaptability, active labour market measures
for the unemployed and lower taxes, at
least for those at the lower end of the
wage distribution. Similar recommendations
were made by the European Employment
Taskforce, which reported in 2003.
A key part of the problem seems to be
that although the types of policies needed
are universal (they apply to all countries),
the processes needed to implement them
are not. The latter must be decided at the
national level within the context of the
institutions and objectives of the national
government, which is much more difficult.
And there are likely to be objections from
many stakeholders with vested interests in
the status quo.
My objective here is not to look at each
country’s labour market performance and
recommend specific measures for reform.
Instead, I want to look at policies that can,
in principle, be effective in achieving the
overall employment targets set at Lisbon.
The novel feature of my approach is
that it puts policy in the context of the
dynamic evolution of the European
economy in a world of rapid technological
progress and increasing international
competition. We need to understand the
underlying causes of low employment in
Europe in relation to growth and economic
development before a policy prescription
can be made.
The connection between jobs
and growth
The Lisbon agenda emphasises the
‘knowledge economy’, which essentially
means jobs and growth in high-tech
sectors. But much of the job expansion that
is needed to satisfy its targets will be in
labour-intensive sectors of the economy,
which experience low productivity growth.
So job creation is not likely to be the main
contributor to growth.
Indeed, the link runs the other way:
more growth will bring job creation. There
is evidence, for example, that increasing the
growth rate of labour productivity increases
the demand for labour, reduces
unemployment and increases participation.
My research (Pissarides and Vallanti, 2004)
finds that increasing productivity growth by
1 percentage point reduces unemployment
by about 1.3 percentage points. Such
changes in the growth rate in Europe are
feasible given the low starting points.
Of course, high growth is not spread
uniformly across the economy. Some
sectors will inevitably grow faster than
others. And high growth usually does not
create many jobs in the sectors that
experience it: rather, it creates wealth,
which in turn creates demand for 
services elsewhere.
The jobs growth that comes with
productivity growth is more widespread
across the economy than the productivity
growth itself, and usually more heavily
concentrated in low productivity sectors
such as retail trade and medical care. The
people who take these jobs need to be
compensated sufficiently to give them the
incentives to enter employment. High
compensation in the low-growth sectors is
achieved through high prices for their final
products, not through more productive use
of resources. This is why we experience
more price inflation and more job creation
in low-productivity service sectors.
The European jobs deficit
How do we know that most jobs will be
created in low-productivity sectors? First, in
recent European history, employment has
been moving out of agriculture and into
the low-productivity service sectors, with
manufacturing showing either a small fall
or no change. In countries that completed
the transition out of agriculture early, such
as the UK and the United States, the
subsequent transition was mainly out of
manufacturing and again into services.
Importantly, however, although average
hours of work decline with economic
development, there is also pressure in these
countries for an increase in the participation
rates of working-age women, especially
those aged 15-50. So historically, European
countries should expect that given their
small agricultural sectors, there will be
pressures on their manufacturing sectors to
contract, as well as pressures for an
increase in women’s employment rates.
The pressures on manufacturing to
contract are likely to intensify with the
emergence of large Asian manufacturing
producers. Trade and export-led growth can
provide a cushion for manufacturing, as
happened in Japan and Germany in the last
30 years, but it is not likely to continue in
the future. Europe has to face the reality of
the dynamics of the 21st century: most
employment growth is likely to come to
service sectors that do not rely on high-tech
knowledge or trade.
In some ways, this is good news for the
Lisbon employment targets. Economic
forces in Europe should be creating
demand for job creation in sectors of the
Europe’s jobs deficit is 
in sectors that are 
labour-intensive with low
productivity growth
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economy that can easily be met with the
existing stock of human capital. But
creating demand is not equivalent to
creating jobs.
The United States is the most advanced
country in this dynamic economic process.
Its manufacturing sector is shrinking and
service employment is rising; women’s
labour market participation is also rising. As
a result, the main gaps in employment now
between Europe and the United States are
in service employment. Production
industries and agriculture occupy more or
less the same fraction of people. Can
Europe expect a similar dynamic evolution
as the one experienced by the United
States and if so, can it sit back and wait for
natural economic forces to satisfy the
Lisbon targets?
This is a difficult question, but given the
different performance of countries within
Europe, despite their similar level of
economic development, the answer is
probably no, at least in the foreseeable
future. Big gaps remain in employment
between Europe and the United States, and
within Europe, mainly between the north
and the south. These gaps are mainly in
business services (such as finance, retail and
transport) and community services (mainly
in health and education).
Figure 2 shows the gaps in the two
types of services. The main gaps are in
business services, with only the UK
surpassing the United States because of its
large financial sector. But there are also
substantial gaps in community services,
with the exception of the Scandinavian
countries (Sweden and Denmark), which
have many community services supported
mostly by the state.
Figure 3 breaks down the
employment gaps in the business sector.
Here the biggest gaps are in retail and
wholesale trade. The gaps in transport
and communication are relatively small.
There are also gaps in financial services,
mainly in business services connected with
real estate and in the provision of a
variety of other services to employers.The
biggest gaps in financial services are in
the southern European countries. 
Figure 4 shows employment growth in
the business services sector. Over the last
30 years, European countries have been
achieving good rates of growth in finance,
real estate and insurance services, which
include high-tech computing services. But
they have not been able to match the US
rate of growth in the retail and wholesale
trade sector, which is the one of this group
characterised by lower productivity growth.
It is clear that the jobs deficit in Europe
is in sectors that are labour-intensive with
low productivity growth. Europe has been
creating jobs in the knowledge economy at
a comparable scale to the United States,
although it has not substantially closed the
gap yet. But the low-growth sectors in the
United States attract big numbers of
workers, especially women, which are not
matched in Europe.
Compensation in these jobs is good in
the United States because the prices of
their final products are relatively high. The
fact that consumers can afford to pay the
high prices is itself the result of more
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Figure 2:
The employment gap in business and community
services between the United States and EU countries
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Figure 3:
The employment gap in business services sectors
between the United States and EU countries
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employment. When women leave the
home to take employment, they create
demand for market services such as
cleaning, food preparation and childcare,
which creates more jobs for others.
Why are European
economies not creating so
many jobs?
The same pressures for an increase in the
consumption of business and community
services are present in Europe. Europe has
more or less caught up with the United
States in productivity per hour, but
because Americans work more hours,
income per head is higher.
But do Americans really work more
hours than Europeans? Americans work
more hours in the market and so create
more jobs, but they work fewer hours at
home. Recent research (Freeman and
Schettkat, 2005) on the hours worked by
Americans and Europeans concludes that
they work approximately the same
number of hours, but Europeans work
much more in the home than Americans
(see Table 1). The difference between
market and home allocation is particularly
marked for women.
European women work on average 8
hours less than American women in the
market, but they work 10 hours more in
the home. They do more house
maintenance, they cook more at home
and they look after relatives. They are
engaged in ‘home production’, something
Americans do much less.
The Lisbon targets imply that
Europeans should move to the market by
‘marketising’ their home production. It is,
of course, debatable whether this is a
good policy to encourage, but how could
it be done?
The natural conclusion is that to
increase employment in Europe, we need
to make the market more accessible to
women, who now shy away from market
work, and we need to create good jobs
in labour-intensive sectors of the
economy. It is interesting, and
encouraging for Europe, that the 
sectors that lag behind the United States
in job creation are women-friendly
sectors: retailing, restaurants and hotels,
and community services such as childcare
and nursing care. Men need not be
displaced from their current jobs to make
room for women.
An explanation why the market
pressures that have given rise to more
employment in the United States have not
had the same impact in Europe runs as
follows. Consumers work out the relative
cost of buying some services in the
market versus providing them at home.
When the price of market goods relative
to per capita incomes is lower, more
households will choose to use the market
for services that have close substitutes in
the home. So to understand why
Europeans use the market less than
Americans, we need to look at the factors
that influence the relative costs of buying
in the market versus producing at home.
There cannot be large differences in
the cost of producing services at home in
Europe and the United States. Consumer
durables are widely available and homes
are as well equipped in Europe as they are
in the United States. The factors that can
explain the differences in employment
patterns in Europe and the United States
must therefore be in the returns to
market work and in the cost of buying
services from the market. The
interpretation of these costs must be
general, to include convenience factors
and not only prices and wages.
Several factors are contributing to
making the products of market work in
Europe too expensive for consumers and
market work itself unattractive for
workers. And the two issues are, of
course, interconnected: if there are
features that make market work
unattractive, they could be offset 
by higher prices for the final product; 
but higher prices would then choke off
demand and so reduce employment.
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Figure 4:
Average annual change in employment rate in
business services sectors, 1970-2004
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Table 1:
Weekly hours of work of men and women aged 25-54 in the
United States and Europe in the early 1990s
Men Women
Market Home Total Market Home Total
United States 44.1 16.1 60.2 28.7 30.1 58.8
European Union 43.4 13.6 57.0 20.7 40.5 61.2
Source: Freeman and Schettkat (2005)
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What can make market work
more attractive?
So the key question is what can make
market work more attractive, especially to
women? First, there are various restrictions
on market work, which, although
individually seemingly unimportant, when
aggregated they add up to a lot. These
include flexibility in market work hours,
flexibility in shop opening times, and the
availability of inexpensive childcare services
(see Freeman and Schettkat, 2005). These
types of facilities make it easier for women
with children, and for those without
children who have a household to run, to
enter employment.
Examples of European countries that
have liberalised restrictions and succeeded
in increasing women’s employment to the
Lisbon targets, include the Netherlands and
the UK. Both countries have very large
numbers of part-time jobs and, in the UK
at least, evenings and weekends are the
busiest times in the shops. The
Scandinavian countries have also
succeeded in raising women’s employment.
A factor here is not just widely available
childcare, but also the fact that many of
the community services marketised in the
United States are provided by the state,
which employs large numbers of women.
Another important factor in the
employment of women is education.
Employment differentials across countries
are lower at higher educational
attainments. Women with university
degrees have similar rates of employment
everywhere. Of course, it would take a
long time for substantially more women to
acquire university degrees and gain
employment. But the impact of higher
education on women’s employment is not
one-for-one. When more women acquire
education and gain employment, they
create demand for the services of other
women with less education. There is a
‘multiplier’ effect of education, which
brings to the market a larger number of
women than the ones leaving college with
higher qualifications.
The initiative to increase education in
Europe comes from the state. But for it to
be effective, two pre-conditions need to be
satisfied. First, women need to know that
jobs will be available and that they would
be compensated as well as men’s jobs.
There is EU legislation against
discrimination, but it is not always
effectively implemented (see Boeri et al,
2005). Increasing the effectiveness of
legislation and making working conditions
good for women will certainly improve the
chances of satisfying the Lisbon targets. In
the United States, there has been high-
profile anti-discrimination legislation since
the early 1970s and it has contributed to
the expansion of women’s employment.
The second pre-condition is that highly
qualified women need to know that there
will be less qualified people around, mainly
women, prepared to do the tasks normally
done in the home. This is where childcare
services are vital, but equally important
(because they affect larger numbers of
women) is the availability of people
prepared to work as cleaners and in
restaurants and laundries.
To achieve this, the EU needs to think
seriously about unskilled migration and its
potential contribution to the Lisbon
agenda. In Cyprus, for example,
employment levels are within the Lisbon
targets. Educational levels and women’s
employment rates are unusually high for a
Mediterranean country. These rates are
supported by large numbers of unskilled
immigrants on regulated fixed-term
contracts, working in business and
community services, mostly domestic
service, nursing and retailing.
Making it easier for
employers
Job creation needs to be attractive to
potential employers too. An obvious policy
reform here is that labour markets should
be liberalised, especially at the lower end
of the skills distribution. This is not new: it
has been emphasised in numerous writings
by the OECD and the European
Commission. But reforms have not been
forthcoming.
The administrative burden on
companies, especially new, smaller
companies, certainly explains some of the
gaps in service jobs. Jobs in business and
community services are frequently
performed within small companies or by
individuals working on their own account.
If these individuals are to be attracted to
the market, it is important that setting up
a small company and running it should be
easy and inexpensive.
For example, there should be one
window for completing all the necessary
administrative work for a new company,
setting it up should be completed within a
week and the company should not be
required to report detailed accounts and
register for VAT if turnover is expected to
be below a certain (generous) limit. Direct
assistance from the state for new
entrepreneurs is also important.
A study of the French retail sector
(Bertrand and Kramarz, 2002) finds that
barriers to the setting up of supermarkets
have a negative impact on the local labour
market. And other studies find that
unimpeded entrepreneurship helps in both
the diffusion of new technologies and the
adaptation of businesses to new
challenges. Diffusion and adaptability are
important for Europe in a world with the
twin challenges of technological catch-up
with the United States and globalisation.
Indeed, with these two challenges,
adaptability is more important than R&D
geared to new discoveries.
Another obvious factor in the
attractiveness of job creation that has
attracted a lot of attention recently is
taxation, which can discourage both
employers and employees. This follows
Edward Prescott’s claim that the entire gap
between European and American hours of
work can be explained by taxation, which
makes work in the home relatively more
attractive because it is not taxed.
Econometric evidence has so far failed
to find a large impact of taxation on
employment, and Prescott’s work has been
criticised for failing to distinguish between
different types of taxation and the uses to
which the tax revenue is put, which must
influence the impact that taxation has on
employment. Nevertheless, taxation clearly
has a bigger impact on economic activity
at the lower end of the productivity
distribution. Profit margins and net gains
from employment are smaller when
productivity is lower so a given tax takes a
bigger proportional slice of net gain.
It is now widely accepted that capital
should not be taxed much because it is
mobile: if one country taxes it, capital will
flee to another. The experience with home
and market work in Europe shows that
low-wage labour is also mobile, between
the home and the market. Based on the
Effective labour market
reforms include more
flexible employment 
and lower taxation of
low-wage jobs 
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same principle, low-wage market work
should not be taxed much either.
Otherwise, it will flee to the home.
What can the European
Commission do?
The most important reforms needed to
achieve the Lisbon targets are at the
national level. Not all EU countries need
the same reforms and it is up to individual
governments to decide what is most
urgent for their situation. But can the
Commission help in any way other than
giving advice and exerting moral pressure?
The answer is yes – and although
much has been done, much remains to do.
The report of Wim Kok’s group (European
Commission, 2004) highlights five areas of
policy that require urgent action. Four of
them are firmly in the national domain:
encouraging R&D; improving the business
climate; improving the performance of the
labour market; and ensuring environmental
sustainability. But the fifth – the
completion of the single market – mainly
requires action from European institutions.
Market integration is important
because European companies can take
advantage of economies of scale. Prices of
goods are generally lower in the United
States than in Europe and the reason is
that US companies have better distribution
networks and make better use of
diversified locations within the United
States. Europe can do the same, but it is
not doing it yet.
The main benefits from European
integration so far have been the benefits
from free trade. The Commission estimates
that in the first 10 years of the single
market, European GDP gained about
1.5%. This is not very much compared
with the annual rate of growth of GDP,
corresponding to about a year’s growth.
There have also been some gains in job
creation but with respect to services, the
biggest component of GDP, integration has
not yet taken place.
The Kok report rightly emphasises that
efforts towards completing the single
market should be stepped up, especially in
the liberalisation of services. Even financial
services are not fully integrated, although
there is an agreement that they should be.
On paper, integration is complete in the
goods sector, but the large differences in
prices that remain across Europe are
evidence that it has not yet fully taken
place. The limits here may be due to
corporate policies and not a matter of
national policies. If that is the case, the
Commission can again take action to
improve integration.
Beyond this channel, the Commission
has mainly emphasised the need for reform
and more effort to achieve the Lisbon
targets. But it has not taken concrete
action. The failure to take the necessary
action at the national level is partly the
result of countries not doing what they
said they would do, and partly not saying
or doing what is needed.
The Commission could work out a
system or incentives to make countries
more willing to take on the necessary
measures. For example, it could give some
financial compensation for research and
other spending that is now financed by
national budgets but which contributes to
the Lisbon targets. Financial aid or
incentives have not been tied closely to the
targets. If the Commission wishes to
accelerate the reform process, this is one
area in which it could contribute a lot.
Conclusions
■ The job creation required to achieve the
Lisbon targets will be mainly in sectors
with low productivity growth: retail
trade, a variety of business services and
community services.
■ European countries have been successful
at creating jobs in the ‘knowledge
sectors’, such as financial services, but
have been unsuccessful at creating them
in the more labour-intensive service
sectors.
■ Most new employment will come from
women now outside the labour force
and it will ‘marketise’ many of the
services now done in the home, such as
childcare and other personal care,
cleaning, shopping, etc.
■ To achieve the new job creation,
employment needs to be made more
women-friendly through more flexibility
of working hours, more flexibility in
shop opening hours and easier
availability of domestic service.
■ Education needs to be further advanced
and supported by less expensive
immigrant labour in the labour-intensive
service sectors, including the home.
■ Other essential labour market reforms
include an increase in the flexibility of
employment, less taxation of low-wage
jobs and fewer administrative burdens
on new entrepreneurs.
■ Finally, the failures of the Lisbon agenda
are not due to a lack of knowledge of
the principles behind the right policies
but a lack of urgency in the reform and
implementation process needed to put
those principles into practice.
This is an edited version of the keynote
address by Christopher Pissarides delivered
at the Austrian Presidency conference on
Innovations in Labour Market Policies:
Challenges in Times of Globalisation, Vienna,
16-17 February 2006. Pissarides is professor
of economics at LSE and director of CEP’s
research programme on macroeconomics.
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